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At 14 she left school on sick leave, never to go back...[].  
“I didn’t have any proper education or qualifications,  
so I had to be a writer. What else would I have done?” 
 
From an interview to Doris Lessing,  
Review Saturday Guardian, 20 January 2007  
1.  Motivation of the paper and literature review1 
It is widely recognized that the size of the Italian underground labour, namely 
labour which is deliberately concealed from the public authorities to avoid payment 
of taxes or complying with regulations (OECD, 2002), is huge, especially when 
compared to other industrialised economies. In 2004, according to official estimates, 
it accounted for 11.7 per cent of the total input of labour; the vast majority of EU15 
members report figures close to 5 per cent (Istat, 2008; European Commission, 
2004). Moreover, Italy is characterised by a striking duality between the Northern 
and the Southern regions: in 2004 irregular labour ranged from 7.5 per cent of total 
employment in Emilia Romagna (North of Italy) to 26.2 per cent in Calabria (South 
of Italy). This geographical divide stands at odds with a substantial homogeneity, at 
least de jure, in terms of tax and audit/punishment policies, and in terms of burden 
of regulation and bureaucracy, which are the standard arguments the literature on 
noncompliance puts forward to explain cross-country differences in the extent of 
the underground sector (Schneider and Enste, 2000). 
Italy ranks badly also in terms of education if compared to other high-income 
economies. In 2005 only 37.5 per cent of the population aged between 25 and 64 
years completed high school, about 8 percentage points less than the OECD 
average. The gap was even wider for the share of those having a college degree (12 
per cent, about half the OECD average). Only 76 teenagers out of 100 get a diploma, 
one of the lowest values among advanced economies (OECD, 2006). Data from the 
2001 Population Census confirm the duality of the country as for education 
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the data. The paper was in part written when Roberta was visiting the Centre for Economic 
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achievement of the labour force: the Southern regions are lagging behind according 
to many schooling indicators (e.g. enrolment rates in the compulsory and secondary 
school, percentage of people with no formal education; Istat, 2005). 
Several studies investigate the relationship between underground labour and 
educational attainment in different countries from an empirical standpoint.  Most of 
them are based on household surveys, a source traditionally regarded as more 
appropriate than firm level data for measuring the extent of informal labour. In fact, 
a surplus of labour input derived from household surveys over that from enterprise 
sources is considered as an indication of non observed labour (OECD, 2002). 
For the Spanish labour market Ahn and de la Rica (1997) find that a higher level 
of education increases the probability of working in the regular sector. Moreover, 
wage returns to education and tenure are much higher for those holding a formal 
job. Similar results are obtained by Gong and van Soest (2001) for the Mexican 
economy. In particular, they show that wage differentials between the formal and 
the informal sector increase with the education level.  
Barth and Ognedal (2005), by proxying the supply of and the demand for 
unreported work respectively with the willingness to receive unreported income 
and with the actual provision of unreported work, show a negative effect on both 
demand and supply of irregular labour of different human capital variables for the 
Norwegian economy. A study for Germany by the Rockwool Foundation (2005) 
finds that education exerts a significant negative effect on the probability of 
participating in black activities, though only for men. The fact that workers engaged 
in shadow employment have, on average, lower educational attainments than 
regular workers, or hold low-skill jobs has been documented for Brazil (Boeri and 
Garibaldi, 2005) and for Bulgaria and Colombia (Peracchi et al., 2007). 
Boeri and Garibaldi (2002), exploiting an ad hoc survey carried out in Sicily, an 
Italian region where the underground economy is traditionally flourishing, show 
that irregular jobs involve mainly workers at the lower end of skill distribution, as 
the proportion of workers with a primary or lower level of education is much larger 
in the shadow sector than in the regular one. They argue, from these results as well 
as from those emerging from a survey conducted by ISAE (2002), that shadow jobs 
are to a large extent low productivity jobs. These results have been later extended 
nationwide by the same authors (Boeri and Garibaldi, 2005).  
We first attempt to evaluate the relationship between engagement in shadow 
labour and schooling attainment for Italy by using the official measures of hidden 
labour available at the regional level in the time span ranging from 1995 to 2004. We 
try to shed light on the role played by education in shaping the heterogeneity across 
regions in the diffusion of irregular labour by regressing a measure of shadow 
employment (the irregularity rate) on an indicator of education (the dropout rate at   7
secondary school2) and on some control variables (see table 1 for a description of 
variables used and for regression results). Dropping out of secondary school turns 
out to have a positive and significant impact on the extent of irregular employment. 
Among the control variables, only the efficiency of the judiciary system and the 
sectoral composition of local economy display coefficients which are statistically 
different from zero at standard confidence level and whose sign conforms to theory: 
in particular, the less efficient the judiciary system is, the bigger the size of 
underground labour. Results in terms of both sign and magnitude of the coefficient 
for dropout are robust to the exclusion of control variables and of regional fixed 
effects. This exercise confirms the hypothesis that underground economy and 
education are interconnected phenomena, but does not provide evidence on the 
direction of causality between them since it fails to address the issue of endogeneity 
(if any) of education choices. An approach based on individual data seems more 
suitable to our scopes, and is then attempted by using microeconomic data on 
households from the Bank of Italy’s Survey on Household Income and Wealth. To 
our knowledge, only two papers provided descriptive evidence on our topic of 
interest based on the same survey (Brandolini and D’Alessio, 2002; Boeri and 
Garibaldi, 2005). 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we discuss on a 
theoretical ground the relationship between informality and level of education. 
Section 3 presents the criteria introduced to identify underground workers in the 
survey. In Section 4 we model the probability of working underground. Section 5 
focuses on selected groups within our sample. In Section 6 we perform some 
sensitivity analysis. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2.  The theoretical framework  
There are two competing views concerning the existence of informal labour. On 
the demand side, working in the underground sector can be regarded as the only 
option for individuals who cannot find a job in the formal sector. In presence of 
wage and non wage rigidities in the formal labour market, such as minimum wage 
and firing costs, the underground sector represents a ‘free-entry sector of last resort’ 
(Fields, 2005). On the supply side, a job in the informal sector could be voluntarily 
chosen by the worker as a better alternative to a formal job, trading social 
protections off for other dimensions of job quality (Maloney, 2004).  
The implied relationship between education and supply of underground labour 
is clearly different in the two cases.  
                                                 
2 Gobbi and Zizza (2007) use the same variable as an instrument for the underground labour, in turn 
supposed to be a determinant of the development of the credit market across the Italian regions.   8
The first line of reasoning provides a simple explanation to the observation that 
less educated people tend to work in the underground economy. Under the 
assumption that education is a signal of an individual’s ability, the presence of an 
informal sector allows individuals whose productivity is below the minimum wage 
to have a job.  In areas characterised by a low level of education of the labour force, 
firms may decide to increase revenues by evading taxes and eluding laws rather 
than hiring more productive workers and adopting new technologies. One possible 
suggestion to the policy maker would be to introduce policies targeted at fostering 
education and improving entrepreneurship, as they would have the beneficial side 
effect of reducing the size of the underground economy. On the other hand, if 
working in the underground economy is a matter of supply, the implications of the 
education level on individual’s probability of working underground are less clear. 
Although working in the underground sector prevents individuals from gaining 
access to some social security provisions, in particular sick leave and pension 
coverage after retirement, some of them may still prefer working in the informal 
sector if they can receive immediate monetary compensation for this renounce. This 
is likely to hold especially for the self-employed, irrespective of the level of 
education. 
A way of combining these two polar views is to regard the underground sector 
as having its own internal duality; in this two-tier view, some informal jobs are 
preferred to formal jobs and some are not (Fields, 2005). 
The framework is further complicated by the fact that the direction of causality 
may be the opposite one. It might be the opportunity to work in the irregular sector 
that influences the choice to acquire higher education. Kolm and Larsen (2003) 
assume that the effort put in increasing the level of schooling is worthwhile only for 
high ability workers, as the educational costs they pay are a decreasing function of 
their ability; these workers apply only for formal jobs. The other workers, referred 
to as “manual”, choose not to attain higher education and face job opportunities in 
both the formal and the informal segments of the labour market. The preferences of 
heterogeneous workers between formal or informal jobs are also modelled by 
Galiani and Weinschelbaum (2007). In equilibrium they find that human capital is 
the factor that determines whether workers are employed formally or informally; in 
particular, low human capital workers operate in the informal sector while high 
human capital workers operate formally.  
Against this background, the following analysis attempts at assessing the 
existence, the magnitude and the direction of the link between education and 
informal labour. 
   9
3.   Identification of the underground workers 
The Bank of Italy carries out every two years the Survey on Household Income 
and Wealth (SHIW thereafter); the sample is composed of about 8,000 households, 
representative of the whole Italian population (Banca d’Italia, 2006). 
Using data on self-reported individuals’ social security positions available 
therein it is possible to identify the underground workers. In the questionnaire it is 
asked whether the person itself, or one of his employers, has ever paid social 
security contributions. Quoting the SHIW questionnaire: 
 
“Considering the lifetime work experience of ..... (name) , did he/she ever pay, or his/her 
employer pay, pension contributions, even for a short period (and even if long ago)?” 
As the questionnaire is very comprehensive and replying is not compulsory, it is 
likely that respondents do not feel threatened or suspicious and would hence reply 
truthfully. However, misreporting cannot be ruled out. Apart from fear of being 
detected, there is in fact presumably a stigma associated with holding an irregular 
job. Many underground workers could be “hidden” among those who declared 
themselves as unemployed, job seekers or inactive at the moment of the interview. 
Boeri and Garibaldi (2002), using the Italian Labour Force Survey, estimate that 
about 45 per cent of those classified as unemployed and 10 per cent of those with an 
inactive status are actually involved in irregular activities. 
Due to the formulation of the question, if an individual replies negatively 
stating, at the same time, that he has been working, this means he has been working 
off the books throughout his entire career. Individuals who are currently irregular but 
have cumulated pension contributions in the past, or those whose main occupation 
is regular but hold an irregular second job are not labelled as underground workers. 
Against this background, this measure is conceivably on the conservative side, and 
we refer to it as a narrow estimate of irregular labour. 
A further question deals with the number of years (or months) the individuals 
(or their employers) have been paying social security contributions up to the time of 
interview (YCONTR). In principle, by comparing this information with that on the 
number of years worked (i.e. with experience; EXPER) it would be possible to 
retrieve a precise indication of social contribution evasion, that occurs when 
YCONTR < EXPER.3 Unfortunately the SHIW does not ask the number of years 
worked, but records both the age at the time of the interview (AGE) and the age 
when the interviewed started working (AGESTART). The difference between AGE 
and AGESTART measures the potential experience (POTEXPER), which 
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corresponds exactly to EXPER only if the worker has had a very regular work 
history. There can be several reasons for this not to be true, such as unemployment 
spells or on-leave periods; moreover, not necessarily leaving a job implies an 
interruption of the payment of social contributions, as it could be either the worker 
who voluntarily continues to pay them or there could be some forms of 
unemployment treatment providing also for the payment of contributions 
(Brandolini and D’Alessio, 2002).  
Given this limitation to the data, some “tolerance” criteria to identify those who 
spent a fraction of their working life underground are needed. Since we are 
interested to permanent effects of the low level of education we are willing to select 
only those individuals who spent a significant fraction of their working life 
underground, that is those who paid too little in comparison with their working 
experience. In particular, we label as underground workers those satisfying the 
following relative criterion4: 
   [1]  YCONTR / POTEXPER < p25 
i.e. the pension coverage must be below the first quartile of the distribution of the 
coverage across individuals of the same gender reporting the same number of jobs 
held. It is in fact conceivable that the lower the number of jobs held, the better the 
variable POTEXPER is proxying the number of years actually worked. We take care 
of differences by gender as women are likely to present more discontinuous career 
profiles due to maternity and childcare. 
Adding these partially underground workers to those included in the narrow 
measure we get a broad measure of underground labour. It is worthy noticing that 
even this broad measure is not fully comparable with that provided by Istat and 
used in Section 1, as it includes workers who were “chronically” underground in 
the past but are regular today and excludes those irregular today but possibly 
regular for most of their life. Still, our measure broken down by region is quite 
strongly correlated (by more than two thirds; see also picture 1) with that released 
by Istat as well as with the measure of tax evasion by Pisani and Polito (2006) and 
with the opinions on tax evasion surveyed by the SHIW 2004 (Fiorio and Zanardi, 
2006; Cannari and D’Alessio, 2007). These checks corroborate the use of our 
measure for the scope of investigating the long term consequences of schooling on 
labour status. 
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working history has been heavily characterised by the irregularity status we also require the 
difference between POTEXPER and YCONTR to exceed ten years (absolute criterion).   11
We pool the observations in the four surveys conducted from 1998 to 2004, 
removing those who appeared more than once.5 The sample is also restricted to 
those aged between 14 and 65. The incidence of irregular labour in selected groups, 
according to both narrow and broad measures, is reported in table 2. The 
percentage of underground workers differs considerably according to geographical 
location and personal characteristics. As expected, it is remarkably higher in the 
South and in the Isles, irrespective of the measure considered. The proportion of 
people in the informal sector is higher among women, young and self-employed 
individuals. The incidence of the underground sector is higher among individuals 
with a compulsory or lower level of education. Descriptive statistics reveal that the 
share of workers in the informal sector does not always decrease linearly with 
education: the reduction is relevant only between compulsory and secondary school 
but not for achievements beyond the secondary school. 
4.  Modelling the probability of working underground 
We model the probability of working underground through pooled probit 
regressions, where our dependent variable takes a value of one if the individual is 
underground, and zero if not. Being underground is set to depend on a wide range 
of socio-demographic and economic variables at the individual level provided by 
the SHIW. The characteristics of our sample by occupational status are summarized 
in table 3. As for educational attainment, the SHIW asks for the level of qualification 
achieved, allowing for the following breakdown: no education (zero years), primary 
school (5 years), junior high school (8 years), vocational high school (11 years), 
general high school or diploma (13 years), short college degree (16 years), college 
degree (18 years), graduate studies (more than 20 years). As in Attanasio, Guiso and 
Jappelli (2002), we convert this information in terms of number of years of 
schooling, by considering the minimum number of years that it takes to achieve a 
certain qualification.6 
Given that we are looking at workers who have been underground for all or 
most of their working life, the other explanatory variables have been selected 
among those reflecting invariant or at least highly permanent conditions (gender; 
province of residence; marital status; having children; kind of occupation; sector of 
economic activity) or among those accounting for the past working history 
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the kind of phenomenon we are investigating, as we are looking at long lasting consequences of 
education in terms of workers’ permanence in the underground sector for a relevant fraction of their 
working history. 
6 The variable education is coded using the number of years given in parenthesis; for the highest 
class a value of 20 years is chosen. Our breakdown is more fine-grained with respect to that in 
Attanasio, Guiso and Jappelli (2002), including vocational high school and short college degree.   12
(experience and its square; number of jobs).7 Most of these variables are pretty 
standard in empirical models attempting at describing working decisions. In our 
specific context, it is reasonable to assume that individuals who value more social 
security provisions are more likely to hold a job in the formal sector (Ahn and de la 
Rica, 1997). For example, being married or having children are likely to be 
associated with a stronger favour for a regular position. 
According to this baseline specification (table 4, column A) the marginal effect of 
years at school on the probability of working underground is, as expected, negative 
and strongly significant. Switching from the mandatory level8 to a college degree 
decreases this probability for men and women respectively by 11 and 14 percentage 
points, which compares to a sample average probability respectively equal to 16 and 
19 per cent. The gain from the compulsory level to the diploma is more pronounced 
than that from the diploma to the college degree. Moving from no formal education 
to the compulsory schooling age lowers the risk of holding an irregular job by 
respectively 15 and 18 percentage points (picture 2). Men are on average less likely 
to work irregularly by 6 percentage points, other things equal; people who never 
got married are more likely by 7 percentage points. The effect of having children is 
positive but barely significant. The higher the experience, the higher the probability 
of being (or having been) underground, while the squared term has a negative sign; 
also having changed many jobs is positively related with the irregularity status. 
Employment in the informal sector is more likely among those who have had at 
least one experience as independent worker and among those employed in the 
tertiary and building sectors. 
So far we have ignored the fact that pensions contributions are paid only by 
those working, and that participation in the labour market is highly non-random. 
Simple probit estimates are thus likely to suffer from the sample selection bias 
induced by the choice (or chance) to enter the labour market, either with a regular 
or an irregular status. 
More formally, we model the worker’s decision as follows, slightly modifying 
the model in Ahn and de la Rica (1997).9 
                                                 
7 Results are not affected if we introduce other “non permanent” conditions, such as being the head 
of the household or the existence of at least another income recipient in the household. 
8 Here and in the rest of the paper we will define as compulsory school the path including primary 
and junior high school. It is however important to precise that only since 1963 the junior high school 
is mandatory and since 1999 the compulsory requirements have been extended further, up to the 15th 
birthday. 
9 In that study worker’s decision is modelled using three stages. In particular, in the second stage the 
individual works in the formal sector if Wf > Ws | Wr < max (Wf, Wu, Ws); in the third stage if the 
worker does not find a job in the formal sector he turns to the underground sector provided that Wu 
> Ws | Wf < Ws  &  Wr < max (Wf, Wu, Ws).   13
Let Wf be the wage10 in the formal sector and Wu that in the underground sector. 
Moreover, let Ws be the value of being unemployed (or of search) and Wr be the 
reservation wage, i.e. the value of leisure. In a first stage the individual decides to 
participate in the labour market if  
Wr < max (Wf, Wu, Ws). 
If wages offered in both the regular and the irregular sectors are too low, he will 
keep on searching. More formally, he stays unemployed as far as 
Ws > max (Wf, Wu) | Wr < max (Wf, Wu, Ws). 
In the second stage he will choose the formal sector and not the irregular sector 
if the former provides the higher wage, i.e.  
Wf > Wu | Ws < max (Wf, Wu) & Wr < max (Wf, Wu, Ws). 
As we are analyzing two discrete decisions (working versus not working and 
being underground versus being regular) we can model them using a probit model 
with sample selection11 (van de Ven and van Praag, 1981), an extension of the 
original Heckman selection model when the response variable is binary. This 
method allows using information from non-working individuals to improve the 
estimates of the parameters in the outcome equation. Our relationship of interest is 
  [2]   i i i u x y + = β
' *
 
where y* is a latent (unobservable) variable. Equation [2] is the outcome equation, 
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In turn, y is observed if and only if another latent variable exceeds a certain 
threshold: 


















s . Equation [3] is the selection or participation equation. In 
our case it models the probability of having ever worked (or the “propensity to 
work”), and can be estimated on the entire sample. The probability of working 
                                                 
10 The term ‘wage’ must be referred to a wider package of job characteristics including not only the 
current monetary compensation but also insurance and pension coverage, work environment, 
working time, location, etc.. 
11 The estimation was performed using the Stata ‘Heckprob’ procedure.   14
underground in equation [2], instead, can be observed only for the sub-sample of 
individuals who have ever worked. The error terms u and e are bivariate normally 
distributed with correlation ρ. If this correlation is found to be different from zero 
standard probit techniques that ignore selection would yield biased estimates. 
Simultaneous estimation of the participation equation and of the outcome 
equation is performed through a maximum likelihood approach. In order to 
strengthen identification we introduce some exclusion restrictions, that is variables 
featuring in the selection equation but not in the outcome equation. Both job 
search12 and whether the individual receives either pensions or transfers seem 
appropriate variables to capture the individual’s decision in participating in the 
labour market. We consider the effort put into searching for a job as a signal of 
labour supply. With respect to the second instrument, we expect that people who 
receive pensions or transfers have less incentives in participating in the labour 
market. Coefficients for both variables are statistically different from zero and signs 
are as expected (table 4, column D). 
The correlation between the error terms13 of the two equations is statistically 
different from zero, supporting our concern for a selection bias; despite this, results 
are fairly consistent with those from the previous specification. Also in this case, 
schooling is estimated to have a significant and negative impact on the probability 
of working underground, only marginally less pronounced than in the baseline 
case: continuing up to college degree instead of dropping out soon after the 
compulsory requirements reduces this probability by 10 percentage points for men 
and by 11 for women (picture 2). Thus, once we control for selection, the difference 
by gender in the impact of education found with the baseline model vanishes. The 
gain from achieving a college degree instead of dropping out after a diploma is now 
more balanced with that from getting a diploma instead of achieving only the 
compulsory level. The benefit is, as one would expect, slightly higher when one 
completes the compulsory school track with respect to those with no formal 
education (respectively 13 and 14 percentage points). Even though the marginal 
effect of being male is now more than halved, the probability of working off the 
books is still constantly higher for women, irrespective of the level of education. 
5.  A look at selected subgroups 
Descriptive statistics referred to in Section 3 showed how heterogeneous the 
                                                 
12 The job search variable is equal to one if the individual has ever put some effort into searching for 
a job, either in the past (if he or she is currently working) or now (if he or she is currently searching). 
13 According to the likelihood ratio test, the correlation ρ between the error terms is significantly 
different from zero (see, in table 4, bottom part of column D); hence we strongly fail to accept the 
null of independent equations.   15
diffusion of underground labour is, depending on individual characteristics. Thus 
now we deepen our analysis by focusing on some specific subgroups within our 
sample. Groups have been built considering one by one breakdowns by gender, age, 
geographic area and kind of occupation. Corresponding predicted probabilities are 
illustrated in picture 3. 
The comparison by gender (north-west chart) confirms our previous findings, 
with a probability for women which is always above that for men; the divide lessens 
with the level of education. Differences by age groups are less marked, with a lower 
likelihood of being underground for the oldest people (i.e. for those, presumably, 
with longer experience in the labour market; north-east chart); the pattern followed 
by the youngsters (between 14 and 34 years old) is slightly different, showing a 
relatively low level of probability of being underground for low-medium levels of 
education. This is consistent with the fact that in most recent years young workers 
have been involved in atypical contracts, that allow for less expensive social security 
treatment. The probability of being underground in the South is at least twice that 
in the North for levels of schooling below the secondary school, and close to 50 per 
cent for those with no formal education; the divide is strongly reduced for college 
graduates and basically nil for subsequent levels of schooling (south-west chart). 
The breakdown by kind of occupation provides very interesting insights in 
order to assess the validity of the theoretical framework we referred to in Section 2. 
The event of being underground is only barely influenced by the level of education 
for the self-employed, whose likelihood is always higher than that for dependent 
workers beyond the compulsory level of schooling (south-east chart). This is 
consistent with the hypothesis that being informal is a desirable option for the self-
employed, while is worse-off for dependent workers, especially for those who 
achieved higher education. As a whole we find hence support to the view of an 
informal sector with its own internal duality.  
6. Sensitivity  analysis 
In this section we check the robustness of our results along different dimensions. 
In particular, we include information available at macro level in order to control for 
local labour demand conditions; we control for the potential endogeneity of the 
level of education and the kind of occupation; we account for measurement error 
issues. As a whole we derive fairly consistent results. 14 
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request.   16
6.1. Influence of local demand conditions 
As the SHIW supplies the residence of the respondent, we can merge 
microeconomic data with information available at macro level in order to control for 
local demand conditions. Specifically, we assign to each individual the 
unemployment rate and the irregularity rate in his/her province of residence. 15 The 
latter in particular, apart from representing the extent of employment opportunities 
in the underground sector, is meant to account for the strength of the social norms, 
which reasonably depends on the fraction of the economy already situated in the 
informal sector. The larger this fraction, the lower is the stigma associated with that 
behaviour, the weaker the social norm. It is also likely that a larger fraction of 
workers in the irregular segment represents an incentive to go idle as it makes more 
difficult for the relevant authorities to detect these irregularities. The inclusion of 
this macro factors leaves our results fairly unaltered; the event of being 
underground is positively affected only by the extent of unemployment at the local 
level, while the irregularity rate emerges as not significant (table 4, column B). 
6.2. Endogeneity issues 
As already said, one might wonder if students drop out of school as they are 
attracted by employment opportunities in the underground sector. If this is the case, 
the direction of causality would be the opposite, flowing from the underground 
status to the education attainment. As a first check we test whether high school 
dropouts are significantly associated with the rate of irregular employment in the 
province, which is meant to proxy for the demand of labour from the underground 
sector. We do this by restricting to the sub-sample of boys and girls aged between 
14 and 19 years, and by defining our outcome variable – probability of dropping out 
- as equal to 1 if he/she does not hold a diploma and is not enrolled in education. 
Restricting the sample by age is intended to better control for the influence of 
current conditions of the local labour market (either formal or informal) on the 
choice of pursuing further education. The extension to the whole sample would 
require data on irregularity and unemployment by province in periods far in the 
past to proxy labour market conditions of the place of education (or the place of 
residence when in education); unluckily, both these pieces of information are not 
available. 
On the right-hand side, apart from the rate of hidden labour in the province, we 
consider: gender; age and its square; parents’ education and parents’ working 
status; region of residence and town size in terms of inhabitants; provincial rate of 
unemployment. Town size should account for supply conditions, whereas 
                                                 
15  Unemployment rates are published by Istat. Irregularity rates at provincial level in the late 
Nineties are available in Censis (2004).   17
availability of schools is arguably lower in smaller towns (e.g. rural or remote 
municipalities) but also in bigger towns (due to congestion). As table 5 shows, the 
size of the local irregular sector and the conditions of the local labour market, as 
well as the town size, do not influence the choice of continuing secondary 
education.16 Boys are more likely to abandon. As supported by other studies (see, 
for Italy, Cingano and Cipollone, 2007), family background matters in shaping 
schooling choices of children: the probability of dropping out of secondary school is 
decreasing in both parents’ educational achievement, with coefficients that are 
remarkably similar. While our evidence on parents’ education is crystal clear, that 
on parents’ working status is more blurred, though pointing to an increase of 
dropout probability when parents are out of the labour force. Unfortunately we 
miss some important variables that are likely to induce students to drop out, such as 
grade repetition or other indicators of poor school performance. 
Furthermore, to credibly identify a causal impact of schooling on the probability 
of working underground on the whole sample we instrument each individual’s 
number of years spent at school with his/her parents’ education. We find that both 
father’s and mother’s education serve as relevant instruments, showing largely 
significant coefficients in the first-stage regression (table 4, column C).17 The 
coefficient for fathers is now twice that for mothers, suggesting – puzzlingly, 
though - that while the children’s choice of remaining at school after the 
compulsory requirements is affected in equal parts by fathers and mothers, this is 
not also the case for the whole length of the educational track. Since our model is 
over-identified (two instruments and one potentially endogenous variable) we can 
adopt a two stage least squares (2SLS) approach and formally test for the validity of 
the instruments chosen through a test for over-identification. The Sargan test of 
overidentifying restrictions fails to reject the null hypothesis that our instruments 
are valid. Finally, the Wald test rejects the null hypothesis of exogeneity only at the 
5 per cent but not at the 1 per cent confidence level. 
Against this background, our results are broadly confirmed. There are no 
remarkable changes with respect to the previous specifications apart from the fact 
that moving to an instrumental variable estimate leads to a smaller effect (in 
absolute value) of schooling on our outcome. The effort exerted into studying for a 
further ten years after the compulsory requirements is still worthwhile, as the 
probability of working underground will shrink by 8 percentage points for men and 
by 11 for women. Achieving the compulsory schooling makes job irregularity less 
                                                 
16 The same holds when: regional dummies are omitted in order to exclude that they absorb the 
variability of the indicators at the provincial level; the sample is extended to those aged up to 23 
years, exploiting a different source for estimates of the local irregularity rate (Gobbi and Zizza, 2007). 
17 Sample size is slightly lower with respect to the baseline estimation due to missing information 
regarding parents’ education.   18
likely with respect to those with no formal education respectively by 11 and 13 
percentage points (picture 2). 
In order for our instrument to be valid we have postulated that parents’ 
education does not affect the working status of children if not through children’s 
education. Arguably, parents’ education could affect children’s working status also 
through other channels, in particular the extent of social contacts, notably an 
important determinant of job search outcomes (see, for example, Cingano and 
Rosolia, 2006). As a robustness check we control for this network effect thanks to a 
specific question on job search channels included in the 2004 survey only, asking 
whether he or she had asked relatives, friends or acquaintances to find a job; our 
results are left unaffected by introducing this further control. 
Apart from education choices, the kind of occupation is likely to be endogenous 
as well. Individuals might prefer an independent position if they expect this makes 
it easier to avoid taxation; education choices could also reflect these expectations. In 
order to control for this issue we have instrumented the kind of occupation with 
parents’ kind of occupation, presumably a good instrument as, at least in Italy, 
occupation persistence across generations is very high (Mocetti, 2007). 
Corresponding estimates still do not change substantially. 
6.3. Measurement error issues 
Unfortunately we do not observe the irregularity status directly, but we measure 
it exploiting information on experience and social contributions. A comparison of 
the latter information between the SHIW and INPS administrative data (see the 
appendix) is definitely reassuring on its reliability. Moreover, the correlations 
between our measure of irregularity and those from external sources, as already 
discussed in Section 3, are indeed quite high. However, since a mismeasured 
dependent variable is not innocuous in nonlinear settings, as it can lead to 
inconsistent estimates, it is relevant to investigate further on this issue to rule out 
the possibility of misclassification. 
The adoption of the criteria described in Section 3 to identify the underground 
workers is clearly judgemental. Choosing a higher (lower) threshold in [1] produces 
the effect of increasing (reducing) the number of those considered as underground. 
We have first restricted ourselves to the narrow measure of underground, i.e. to 
those who have been engaged in the shadow sector throughout their whole career.  
We still find a sizeable effect of education on the probability of being underground 
(table 6). Men who achieve compulsory education face a probability of being stuck 
in an informality trap which is less than half that for those with no education at all 
(11 versus 5 per cent); this probability shrinks further for those taking a college 
degree (2 per cent). For women the dynamics is broadly the same, though the   19
probability levels are remarkably higher: from 17 to 7 per cent by completing 
compulsory schooling with respect to those with no qualification, decreasing 
further to 3 per cent for college graduates. Finally, results have been checked against 
different values of the thresholds both in the relative and in the absolute criteria 
adopted to retrieve the broad measure. We find very mild changes in the extent of 
estimated coefficients and of their standard errors. 
Another check benefits of the availability in the SHIW of the length of the 
interview and of the interviewer's opinion on the quality of the responses: both 
variables can reasonably account for how precise information collected could be. 
Their introduction in the right-hand side of our probit with selection has not altered 
the results. 
Finally, and more formally, we have tested for misclassification of our binary 
dependent variable following the approach developed by Hausman et al. (1998). Let 
0 a  be the probability of recording a variable as 1 when the true value is 0 and let  1 a  
be the probability of recording a 0 when the true value is 1. The expected value of 
the observed dependent variable is 
[4]             ( ) β
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'
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misclassification, i.e. when both  0 a  and  1 a are zero. We have estimated equation [4] 
with nonlinear least squares, which involves minimizing  
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where  () . F  is the normal distribution and explanatory variables are as in the 
baseline probit. Measurement problems seem minor in this exercise: we have 
derived estimates for  0 a  and  1 a  which are both statistically indistinguishable from 
zero (equal to 0.009 [0.12] and 0.133 [0.33], respectively, with p-values in brackets). 
7. Conclusions 
The paper has tested the relationship between irregular labour and schooling 
achievement for the Italian economy. We have used microeconomic data on 
households from the Bank of Italy’s SHIW, which allows identifying irregular 
workers by relying on individuals’ self reported social security positions. 
We have shown that having low education levels sizeably and significantly 
increases the probability of working permanently underground. In this regard, our 
contribution corroborates, on an empirical standpoint, the evidence found for other   20
countries. By explicitly modelling this relationship it also adds to the existing, albeit 
very scarce, literature referred to Italy. Apart from controlling for a wide range of 
socio-demographic and economic variables, we have addressed potential 
endogeneity and selection issues and checked the consistency of our results along 
different dimensions. 
The data lead to an estimated reduction by at least 10 and 11 percentage points 
of the probability of working off the books when respectively boys and girls reach a 
college degree instead of dropping out of school at the compulsory age. This 
compares to an average observed probability of 16 and 19 per cent respectively. The 
gain is slightly higher for those completing the compulsory school track with 
respect to those with no formal education at all (respectively 13 and 14 percentage 
points). Remarkable differences by gender have emerged instead in absence of a 
proper treatment of the selection bias induced by the non random participation into 
the labour market. We have not been able instead to support that job opportunities 
in the underground labour market induce students to drop out of school. 
By focusing on selected subgroups we have detected marked differences in the 
probability of working off the books by gender, geographic area and kind of 
occupation. The event of being underground is strongly influenced by the level of 
education attained in all cases but for the self-employed. The latter result is 
consistent with the view of an informal sector with its own internal duality. 
Working in the underground sector is worse-off for dependent workers, especially 
for those with higher education. For the self-employed this probability is only 
barely influenced by the extent of education, and beyond the compulsory schooling 
level this probability is consistently higher than for dependent workers, suggesting 
a desirability of the informality option.   21
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Appendix. Comparison between SHIW and social security records 
In this paper we use data on pension contributions resulting from the SHIW; as 
for any other information gathered through surveys they can suffer from a number 
of sampling and non sampling errors. The availability of the same type of 
information from administrative sources such as the social security records collected 
by INPS (Italian National Social Security Institute) allows us to assess how reliable 
the data we use are. To ensure comparability we have excluded from SHIW those 
working in the agricultural and in the public sectors, and have restricted to 
individuals working in 2004 and born after 1956, as the INPS archive starts 
recording only from 1970. The picture compares the median number of years in 
which pension contributions have been paid by age, as emerging from the SHIW 
and the INPS archives. “Declared” and “actual” pension contributions are 
remarkably similar at most ages.18 
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18 We repeated the same exercise considering men and women separately and still obtained fairly 
similar results between SHIW and INPS years of contributions.   24





Dependent variable: IRR 
 
Two way fixed effect estimate 
DROPOUT   0.26***   (0.08) 
ENF   2.65***    (0.93) 
UNEM   0.02       (0.02) 
GDPPC  4.89       (8.09) 
SHAG  -0.60**       (0.28) 
SHCO  -0.55***      (0.16) 
SHSE   -0.12       (0.14) 
Constant  -45.77       (90.79) 
      Number of observations  180 
R-square  0.41 
F-test  6.82 (0.00) 
Notes: our elaborations on Istat data for 20 Italian regions in the time span 1995-2004. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * indicate a significance level 
of 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent respectively. IRR is the rate of irregularity in the 
private sector, calculated from that published by Istat excluding from the denominator 
the labour force employed in the Public Administration. Hidden labour regional 
estimates are obtained by comparing several sources of information (such as surveys on 
firms and households, census, administrative data, etc.) and, after allowing for 
pertinent conceptual differences, giving economic meaning to discrepancies detected 
(Istat, 2008). DROPOUT is the rate of dropo u t  a t  t h e  s e c o n d  y e a r  o f  t h e  s e c o n d a r y  
school. ENF is computed as the average number of days in logs that it takes a 
bankruptcy procedure to be worked out in courts. UNEM is the rate of unemployment. 
GDPPC is the ratio between GDP and the population aged 15 years and above; in logs. 
SHAG, SHCO and SHSE are the shares of value added for the agriculture, the 
construction and the services sectors respectively, where the manufacturing sector is 
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Table 2. Percentage incidence of irregularity in selected groups.  
Narrow and broad measures 
Groups Narrow  Broad 
Men  7.1 16.1 
Women  9.3 19.2 
14-30 years old  18.4 19.5 
31-40 years old  8.2 17.8 
41-50 years old  4.8 18.4 
51-65 years old  4.4 15.3 
North  4.7 12.0 
Centre  6.3 15.5 
South and Isles  14.7 27.7 
Compulsory school or below  9.0 22.4 
High school  6.7 12.5 
College degree or beyond  8.0 11.9 
Always dependent worker   7.4 16.1 
Always independent worker  15.4 24.4 
Either independent or dependent  4.5 18.5 
Only one job in working history  10.5 18.2 
More than one job in working history  5.0 16.5 
Total  7.9 17.3 
Notes: our estimations on 1998-2004 SHIW. See Section 3 for definitions of narrow 
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Table 3. Characteristics of the sample by occupational status 





Percentage of males  57.7 52.3  30.8  49.3 
Percentage of singles  25.0 29.0  60.1  35.5 
Percentage having children  72.7 74.5  87.3  77.1 
Percentage achieved compulsory school or below (omitted category)  48.2 65.8  64.5  55.0 
Percentage achieved high school degree  41.3 26.8  31.5  36.7 
Percentage achieved college degree or above  10.5 7.4  4.0  8.3 
Average years of (potential) experience  22.9 23.1  --  22.9 
Average number of jobs held  1.96 2.05  --  1.97 
Percentage always dependent workers (omitted category)  76.0 69.6  --  74.9 
Percentage always independent workers  10.8 15.8  --  11.7 
Percentage either dependent or independent workers  13.2 14.6  --  13.4 
Percentage in agriculture  6.0 9.3  --  6.5 
Percentage in manufacturing   29.5 22.0  --  28.5 
Percentage in building sector  6.2 15.4  --  7.4 
Percentage in tertiary sector (omitted category)  58.3 53.3  --  57.6 
Notes: our calculations on 1998-2004 SHIW. Averages are computed using sample weights and using the entire sample of 
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         Table 4. Probability of working underground (broad measure) 
Probit model with sample selection (D) 
Explanatory variables  Baseline probit model (A) 
Baseline probit  model 
with provincial variables 
(B) 
Probit model with 
endogenous regressor (C)  Outcome equation  Selection eq. 
      Coefficients  Marg. 
Eff. 
    Coefficients  Marg. 
Eff. 
    Coefficients  Marg. 
Eff. 
    Coefficients  Marg. 
Eff. 
Coefficients 
                  
Male *  -0.265***   (0.020)  -0.062  -0.258***   (0.028)  -0.061  -0.289***   (0.022)  -0.065  -0.112***   (0.021)      -0.027    0.90***   (0.02) 
Never married *   0.297***   (0.027)  0.073   0.298***   (0.035)  0.074   0.324***   (0.029)   0.077   0.236***   (0.027)    0.058   -0.55***   (0.03) 
Had children *   0.044**    (0.023)  0.010   0.048*       (0.027)  0.011   0.093**    (0.025)   0.020   0.017        (0.022)    0.004   -0.13***   (0.03) 
Years at school  -0.065***  (0.003)  -0.015  -0.064***  (0.005)  -0.015  -0.050***  (0.007)  -0.011  -0.053***  (0.003)   -0.013    0.03***   (0.00) 
Experience   0.009***   (0.003)  0.002   0.010***   (0.003)  0.002   0.009***   (0.003)  0.002   0.016***   (0.003)    0.004   
(Experience/10)2  -0.023***   (0.005)  -0.005  -0.024***   (0.006)  -0.006  -0.017***   (0.006)  -0.004  -0.036***   (0.005)   -0.008   
Number of jobs   0.031***   (0.004)  0.007   0.031***   (0.008)  0.007   0.036***   (0.005)  0.008   0.029***   (0.004)    0.007   
Always independent *   0.316***   (0.028)  0.081   0.312***   (0.057)  0.081   0.337***   (0.030)  0.085   0.331***   (0.027)    0.079   
Either dep. or indep. *   0.204***   (0.028)  0.050   0.189***   (0.037)  0.047   0.208***   (0.030)  0.049   0.226***   (0.028)    0.053   
Agriculture *  -0.262***   (0.042)  -0.053  -0.278***   (0.055)  -0.056  -0.250***   (0.050)  -0.048  -0.220***   (0.041)   -0.047   
Manufacturing *  -0.442***   (0.026)  -0.090  -0.432***   (0.038)  -0.089  -0.432***   (0.030)  -0.084  -0.395***   (0.025)   -0.082   
Building sector *   0.206***   (0.036)  0.051    0.212***   (0.044)  0.054  0.220***   (0.042)  0.053     0.248***   (0.035)    0.066   
Rate of underg. labour     0.002       (0.007)   0.000       
Rate of unemployment     0.025***    (0.009)    0.006             
Constant      -0.129     (0.216)    -0.361***    (0.170)        -0.784***  (0.292)     -0.416**    (0.214)     -1.20***  (0.41) 
Father’s education     § 0.259*** (0.007)      
Mother’s education      § 0.131*** (0.008)     
Age            0.08***   (0.01) 
(Age/10)2         -0.03***   (0.01) 
Pension or transfers *         -1.27***   (0.03) 
Ever searched for job *          1.65***   (0.03) 
Place of residence *  Province Region  Province  Province 
               
Wald test of exogeneity     4.12 (0.04)^   
Overidentif. restr. test     0.006 (0.94) ^   
LR test indep. equations       609.10 (0.00)^ 
         
Number of observations  28,459  28,459  24,960  40,725 (uncensored: 28,459) 
Observed probability  0.173 0.173  0.165  0.173   
Predicted probability  0.145 0.149  0.138  0.154   
         
Notes: an asterisk in the first column indicates that the variable is a dummy. See table 3 for omitted categories. Marginal effects evaluated at the sample mean. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses; in column (B) errors are clustered by province. The symbols ***, **, * indicate a significance level of 1 per cent, 5 per 
cent and 10 per cent respectively. (§) Coefficient of the instruments in the first-stage regression.  (^) P-value of the corresponding test statistics in parenthesis.   28  
                              Table 5. Probability of dropping out of school  





Coefficients Marginal  effects 
Male *  0.238***   (0.073)  0.033 
Age  1.973***   (0.362)  0.276 
(Age/10)2  -5.359*** (1.085)  -0.748 
Father’s education (in years)  -0.095***   (0.012)  -0.013 
Mother’s education (in years)  -0.088***   (0.011)  -0.012 
Father: dependent worker *  -0.094       (0.063)  -0.013 
Father: independent worker *  -0.148      (0.099)  -0.019 
Father: not working* (omitted category)    
Mother: dependent worker *  -0.018       (0.082)  -0.003 
Mother: independent worker *  -0.409***   (0.156)  -0.044 
Mother: not working* (omitted category)    
Town size: less than 20,000 *    -0.055       (0.119)   -0.008 
Town size: 20,000-40,000 *     -0.015       (0.119)   -0.002 
Town size: 40,000-500,000 *   0.088       (0.121)   0.012 
Town size: more than 500,000 * (omitted category)    
Rate of underground labour      0.026       (0.019)  0.004 
Rate of unemployment      0.007      (0.019)   0.001 
Region of residence *  yes 
Constant  -18.71***    (3.097)   
   
Number of observations  3,802 
Observed probability  0.144 
  Predicted probability  0.074 
Notes: individuals between 14 and 19 years old. An asterisk in the first column indicates that the 
variable is a dummy. Marginal effects evaluated at the sample mean. Standard errors, reported in 
parentheses, are clustered by province. The symbols ***, **, * indicate a significance level of 1 per cent, 5 
per cent and 10 per cent respectively.   29  
          
                        Table 6. Probability of working underground (narrow measure) 
 
Probit model with sample selection   
Explanatory variables  Baseline probit model 
Outcome equation  Selection eq.   
      Coefficients  Marg. Eff.      Coefficients    Marg. Eff.  Coefficients   
            
Male *  -0.286***   (0.027)  -0.029  -0.138***   (0.027)      -0.014    0.90***   (0.02) 
Never married *   0.319***   (0.033)  0.035   0.256***   (0.032)    0.028   -0.58***   (0.03) 
Had children *  -0.060**     (0.030)  -0.006    -0.093***  (0.029)    -0.010   -0.13***   (0.03) 
Years at school  -0.056***   (0.004)  -0.005  -0.043***  (0.004)   -0.004    0.03***   (0.00) 
Experience   -0.057***   (0.003)  -0.005   -0.049***   (0.003)    -0.005     
(Experience/10)2   0.073***   (0.007)   0.007   0.061***   (0.007)    0.006     
Number of jobs   0.009       (0.006)  0.001   0.010*      (0.006)    0.001     
Always independent *   0.476***   (0.033)  0.062   0.491***   (0.032)    0.050     
Either dep. or indep. *   0.027        (0.043)  0.003   0.050        (0.043)    0.005     
Agriculture *  -0.264***   (0.056)  -0.021  -0.215***   (0.055)   -0.019     
Manufacturing *  -0.416***   (0.035)  -0.034  -0.363***   (0.034)   -0.031     
Building sector *  0.110**    (0.046)  0.011       0.155***   (0.046)    0.018     
Constant      -0.620     (0.458)     -0.659**    (0.330)  -1.39***  (0.41) 
Age     0.08***   (0.01) 
(Age/10)2     -0.04***   (0.01) 
Pension or transfers *     -1.27***   (0.03) 
Ever searched for job *     1.65***   (0.03) 
Province of residence *  yes yes   
      
LR test of indep. equations    332.58 (0.00)^   
        
Number of observations  28,459  40,725 (uncensored: 28,459)   
Observed probability  0.079 0.079     
Predicted probability  0.046 0.050     
        
Notes: an asterisk in the first column indicates that the variable is a dummy. See table 3 for omitted categories. 
Marginal effects evaluated at the sample mean. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, 
* indicate a significance level of 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent respectively. (^) P-value of the 
corresponding test statistics in parenthesis. 
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Picture 1. A comparison of different measures of irregularity
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Notes and sources: Pisani and Polito (2006), Istat (2008) and our elaborations on SHIW. Irregular labour is the percentage of irregular labour 
units over the total. Tax morale is the percentage of people replying that tax evasion is a very serious or serious problem. Tax non-compliance 























Notes: predicted probabilities are evaluated for men and women at the corresponding number of years of schooling and at the sample mean 
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